"Divinitie, and poesie, met" : Herbert, Puttenham, and the craft of the devotional lyric by Sharp, Zachary Daniel
  
The Report committee for Zachary Daniel Sharp 
 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following report: 
 
 
 
 
“Divinitie, and Poesie, Met”: Herbert, 
Puttenham, and the Craft of the 
Devotional Lyric 
 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED BY SUPERVISING 
COMMITTEE: 
 
 
 
 
 
Frank Whigham, Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Davida Charney, Co-Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
“Divinitie, and Poesie, 
Met”: Herbert, Puttenham, 
and the Craft of the 
Devotional Lyric 
 
by 
 
 
Zachary Daniel Sharp, B.A. 
 
 
Report 
 
 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
the University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment of 
the Requirements for the 
Degree of 
 
 
Master of Arts 
 
 
The University of Texas at Austin 
May 2015 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Divinitie, and Poesie, 
Met”: Herbert, 
Puttenham, and the Craft 
of the Devotional Lyric 
 
by 
 
 
Zachary Daniel Sharp, M.A.  
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
SUPERVISORS:  Frank Whigham, Davida Charney 
 
 
 
 
Recent scholarship which addresses the presence in George Herbert’s 
poetry of both a rhetoric of courtesy and of Christian piety generally regards the 
two as incompatible; scholars have sought to show that Herbert renounced this 
courtly rhetoric entirely, incorporated it somewhat reluctantly into his poetry, or 
was unable to suppress its global influence on his poetic method.  I argue that 
what previous authors have neglected to consider when accounting for the 
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relationship of courtly rhetoric to Herbert’s piety is the analogous function easing 
anxiety has in both courtesy theory and Reformed approaches to pastoral care.  
To this end, I aim to demonstrate that Herbert (who was himself a parson) 
incorporates into his major work, The Temple, a method of easing anxiety that 
Calvinism obviates: how to gauge and improve one’s “rank” or status with 
regard to election or reprobation.  Calvinism, specifically the “experimental 
predestinarian” tradition in England, transposes matters of agency from the 
sphere of works to that of faith, to the act of discovering evidence of one’s election 
by close scrutiny of one’s disposition toward believing.  This, I claim, is similar to 
courtesy theory’s aim to provide a metric for self-advancing conduct.  I make the 
case that the overlap between the therapeutic functions of both predestinarian 
theology and courtesy theory can be located in the argument for aesthetic 
discernment found in George Puttenham’s poetry manual/courtesy book, The Art 
of English Poesy.  Rather than presenting rules of decorum, Puttenham presents 
extensive examples that, if one is able to discern from them rules of conduct, 
argue tacitly for the reader’s the requisite faculty of discernment.  By presenting a 
large number of elaborate poetic conceits, I believe that Herbert engages in a 
process that, by thematizing extensively in his poetry the complexities of 
Christian conduct, argues in turn for a similarly ingrained faculty of discernment; 
the ability to discern the “correct” rendering of doctrine in Herbert’s poetry 
functions as evidence of election.  Herbert thus works to ameliorate anxieties 
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surrounding matters of election by integrating a pastoral role into his lyrics not 
wholly at odds with matters of self-advancement. 
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Attempts to account for the curious tension between George Herbert as a man on the 
make” and Herbert as a humble country parson have generally considered the relationship of 
piety and courtesy an either/or proposition: either he flirted with ambition and privilege (he 
certainly had both) only to renounce or fail at courtly life, or he accepted and recapitulated these 
ideals of courtly conduct in a religious rhetoric that incorporated their basic social logic.  Richard 
Strier, for instance, believes Herbert’s early fascination with matters of ambition to be almost 
entirely absent from his mature lyrics.  In Strier’s mind, while the “The Church-porch” 
represents a young, ladder-climbing Herbert, what he perceives as later additions to The Temple 
renounce such motives: “Herbert came to transcend the spiritual commercialism of ‘The Church-
porch’ — Reformation theology, fully apprehended, took care of that.”1  On the other hand, 
Michael C. Schoenfeldt seeks to demonstrate that Herbert “shows not only how social concerns 
constantly interpenetrate the sacred world to which they are contrasted but also how devotional 
postures of submission are continually infiltrated by the subtle forms of opposition or ambition 
they both enable and disguise.”2  In a similar vein, Cristina Malcolmson places The Temple 
within the context of the “Sidney-Herbert coterie and its social rituals,” which in her mind 
integrated Herbert’s major religious lyrics into a situation of ambitious poetic contest.3   
The general interpretive strategy suggested by the authors above is that we must account 
for the paradox between pious and self-advancing motives, insofar as piety is considered 
                                                 
1 Richard Strier, “Sanctifying the Aristocracy: ‘Devout Humanism’ in François de Sales, 
John Donne, and George Herbert,” The Journal of Religion 69, no. 1 (1989): 57. 
 
2 Michael C. Schoenfeldt, Prayer and Power: George Herbert and Renaissance 
Courtship (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 24. 
 
3 Cristina Malcolmson, Heart-Work: George Herbert and the Protestant Ethic (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 69. 
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antithetical to ambitious conduct: either these authors renounce the latter in favor of the former 
or they incorporate it as a somewhat foreign body into interpretations of Herbert’s religious 
discourse.  I seek to demonstrate that courtesy theory and Protestant theology reconcile 
themselves in Herbert to the degree that Herbert is invested in the pastoral duty of relieving 
anxiety about matters of election and reprobation, which, in light of Calvinism’s elision agency 
regarding such matters (the doctrine of predestination precludes the ability to save oneself), 
involves a rhetoric of advancement as a tacit method of spiritual improvement.  R.T. Kendall’s 
study of English Calvinism asserts that “to urge men to make their calling and election sure to 
themselves” was one of several central principles on which mainstream English Protestant 
divines of the early seventeenth century based conceptions of pastoral care.4  Courtesy theory, in 
one of its various modes, eased anxiety by providing a metric for efficacious conduct and an 
ability to code failure as an ethical progression away from a site of “corruption”5 (rationalizing 
becoming a preacher instead of a courtier by convincing oneself that the court is corrupt, for 
instance), arguing for agency when in reality there was little to none involved.  In Calvinism 
failure is doctrinal, as the Fall became the basis in predestinarian theology for theorizing the 
incapacity to advocate spiritually for oneself, and furthermore agency shifts to a similar capacity 
of self-perception —the capacity to perceive election becomes, in a circular form of reasoning, 
evidence for election.   
In accounting for this elision of agency, I believe Herbert must engage in a practice of 
theorizing conduct intuited much earlier by George Puttenham.  Instead of codifying rules of 
                                                 
4 R.T. Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649 (Bletchley: Paternoster, 1997), 25. 
 
5 Frank Whigham, Ambition and Privilege: The Social Tropes of Elizabethan Courtesy 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 21. 
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conduct, Puttenham resorts to a catalog of historical examples of courtliness because, as he puts 
it, “decencies are of sundry sorts,”6 and because difficulty inevitably results in explaining “what 
this good grace is and wherein it consisteth, for peradventure it be easier to conceive than to 
express.”7  I argue that, just as Puttenham places the interpretive onus on the reader to discern 
matters of “decency,” so too does Herbert with regard to matters of Christian conduct 
represented in his poetry.  Herbert understood that part of the allure of Reformation theology, 
manifested particularly in its Calvinist strains, was the allure of self-sufficiency: liberating faith 
from the arena of works is tantamount to arguing against the high-pressure sphere of conduct.  
Richard Strier identifies “the question with which… New Historicism has vainly struggled” as 
“the question of the appeal of Reformation theology.”  His suggested answer, that this theology 
“provided a critique of and refuge from the world of competitive and self-serving strategizing of 
which the new historicists have given us so convincing a portrait”8 is thus quite instructive in 
assessing the appeal Herbert might have ascribed to it.  Yet Herbert also understood Reformation 
theology’s downside: its emphasis on interiority and spiritual self-sufficiency excluded a central 
advantage of explicit behavioral metrics like those found in courtesy theory, that of simply 
having the ability to refer to that metric for the purposes of gauging or improving one’s status.  I 
do agree with Strier, however, that Herbert cannot simply recapitulate courtesy theory directly in 
                                                 
6 George Puttenham, The Art of English Poesy: A Critical Edition, Edited by Frank 
Whigham and Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 3.23.350. 
 
7 Ibid., 3.23.347. 
 
8 Richard Strier, Resistant Structures: Particularity, Radicalism, and Renaissance Texts 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995), 117.  
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his poetry,9 which would commit him to the error of using the logic of worldly struggle to solve 
a Reformed theological problem that involves the tenuous relationship of faith to good works. 
Herbert, then, must find a third way.  Because spiritual goods can no longer be assessed 
according to their worldly benefit, and work can no longer bring one any assurance of obtaining 
what theologian William Perkins calls “saving faith,”10 Herbert’s method must be one that allows 
scrutiny of decorous conduct that shows at least some measure of self-improvability in a context 
where labor is disallowed.  He achieves this by performing a passive act with positive rhetorical 
and doctrinal force.  By not correcting “errors” in his poetry — that is, by leaving in tension 
poems and parts of poems (conceits, images, metaphors, etc.) that are not always doctrinally 
coherent — he intentionally leaves behind a palimpsest of poetic conduct, forcing the reader to 
discern the correct doctrinal interpretation from it.  This process accounts doctrinally for the 
“constant reinvention” that Helen Vendler points to in Herbert’s poetry, that a “Herbert poem is 
often ‘written’ three times over, with several different, successive, and self-contradictory 
versions coexisting in the poem.”  While Vendler is concerned more with the “reinvention of the 
poem as it unfolds toward its final form,”11 what I am concerned with here are Herbert’s possible 
theological motives behind the process itself, specifically how it functions as a device that argues 
for the reader’s ability to discern election.  Readerly negotiations of decorum in Herbert’s poetry 
argue for this faculty of discernment in a way that codifying rules cannot; the fact that rules 
contain overt statements of how to improve, and thus do not involve the reader’s active will in 
                                                 
9 See note 1 above. 
 
10 Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 51-76. 
 
11 Helen Vendler, The Poetry of George Herbert, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1975), 29. 
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interpretation, lessens the readerly engagement necessary for such active attention to the faculty 
of discernment.  This is one way of getting around the problem of representing behavior in a 
Calvinist context; the elaborate conceits, for which Herbert and other “Metaphysical” poets are 
so well known, in this sense, represent elaborate poetic situations that require discernment on the 
part of the reader to perceive the most “appropriate” interpretation of them.  Success in doing so, 
I believe, would be of equal evidentiary status as other self-scrutinizing claims of election.  How 
best to construct poems, the central question of Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy, in Herbert 
then becomes the question of how best to present to the reader tacit arguments for agency and 
self-improvability in the form of equally tacit arguments for the reader’s faculty of discernment. 
Calvinist Anxiety and Self-Advancement 
 Christian theology in general contains within it the global, ingrown failure of the Fall of 
Man.  Perhaps cutting deeper in some than concerns over rank, the Fall entailed a crucial 
incapacity on the part of Christians to abide fully by God’s law.  In essence, Reformation 
doctrine and courtesy culture seem inversely related to a central catalyzing anxiety that exists in 
both, that resulting from the tension between ascribed and achieved identity.12  In sixteenth 
century aristocratic culture, increased social mobility made this particular breed of anxiety highly 
motivating to both established and upstart courtiers,13 both of whom found in courtesy books 
strategies for dissembling achievements behind the rhetoric of ascription.  Barbara Lewalski 
makes the crucial point that, to consider “biblical poetics” as a proper “Renaissance/seventeenth-
                                                 
12 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 1-31. This chapter, “Courtesy Literature and Social 
Change,” contains an extensive rendering of ascribed and achieved identity as the central 
catalyzing agent of Elizabethan aristocratic anxiety. 
 
13 Ibid.  See also Lawrence Stone, “Social Mobility in England, 1500-1700,” Past & 
Present 33 (1966): 16-17; 33-35.  
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century phenomenon,” we must look for its central assumptions and axioms in “such sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century materials as biblical commentaries, rhetorical handbooks, poetic 
paraphrases of scripture, emblem books,” and so on.  According to Lewalski, the wide dispersal 
of concerns surrounding art and religion, working in tandem in biblical poetics, must be 
accounted for by “the tensions over the relation of art and truth which were brought into new 
prominence by the Reformation.”14  I would add that, for English gentlemen, the anxiety over 
status made them well prepared for the coming anxiety over election and reprobation that 
Reformation theology foregrounded and which came to a head in the seventeenth century, and 
thus that courtesy books in some capacity need to be added to that list.  Easing anxiety is, as we 
have seen, one central motive which aligns the courtesy tradition and Protestant doctrine.  In his 
study of the courtesy tradition, Frank Whigham argues that there are written into courtesy books 
tropes which gave those who failed at obtaining preferment or proximity to court the ability to 
mystify that failure “as a progression away from the grubbing for temporal power” behind “some 
transcendental ideal of pastoral or Neoplatonic society.”  Here, one can see a degree of symmetry 
between maneuvering away from the pressure of climbing the sixteenth century English social 
ladder and the kind of “way out” Protestant interiority, grounded in its own kind of similarly 
“transcendent” doctrine, might have provided to an early seventeenth century aristocrat like 
Herbert.  As Whigham claims, “A final central employment of these tropes of courtesy was to 
relieve these strains [of ‘stress and opportunity’], by postponing, accounting for, or mystifying 
the various levels of personal failure.”15  The Calvinist strains of Reformed Christianity, 
                                                 
14 Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious 
Lyric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 5. 
 
15 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 21. 
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introduced into England at the beginning of the seventeenth century by William Perkins and his 
coterie of “experimental predestinarians,” had to develop strategies to deal with similar anxieties 
arising from the elect/reprobate distinction16 — what we might call Calvinism’s version of the 
distinction between achievement and ascription.  While dogmatically Calvinism mirrors ascribed 
identity to the degree that, like the noble status of an aristocrat by birth, election is predetermined 
and cannot be actively sought by the individual Christian, in practice the doctrine of irresistible 
grace lead to enormous pressure to demonstrate belonging to the rank of the elect.  Considering 
identity as it relates to social mobility, insofar as it involves questions of self-improvability and 
agency, makes for a useful analogue to the problem of identifying as elect: “Until the late 
fifteenth century, birth was the principle determinant of rank, the natural conduit for the self-
evident.  Individual skill, education, and rhetorical self-presentation might enhance the clarity of 
identity, or even improve the local conditions of life, but alteration of social rank by personal 
effort … was quite uncommon.”17  English Calvinism, especially that of Perkins, “begins with 
the assumption of the inalterable decree of reprobation.”18  One crucial distinction between 
issues surrounding social mobility and Calvinist theology, however, is the fact that in Calvinist 
theology there was no “natural conduit for the self-evident.”  The lack of evident class identifiers 
in Calvinism became both a source of anxiety and a means for its resolution: because the 
immutability of the decree of reprobation cannot be perceived as directly as social rank, 
enhancing the “clarity of identity” in effect became a kind of alteration of rank by a labor of self-
                                                                                                                                                             
 
16 Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 1-9. 
 
17 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 7. 
 
18 Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 7-8. 
 
8 
 
examination.  The “inalterable decree” of election/reprobation thus functioned as a “warning to 
professing Christians to examine themselves lest they happen to possess but a temporary [self-
deluding] faith.”19  Self-presentation as a member of the elect in effect gained evidentiary status 
in the quest to discover whether one is in fact elect.  In other words, in the Calvinist worldview, 
ascribed identity contained within it the means for its achievement.  A.G. Dickens goes so far as 
to say that, “far from inducing fatalism, Calvinist doctrine instilled a burning desire to prove to 
oneself and others that one’s name stood upon the roll of the elect.”20   
Calvin himself was equivocal on the exact nature of the relationship of faith to the active 
will, and furthermore on how much room there actually was for active self-improvement and 
agency in general within his theology.  According to William J. Bouwsma, the humanist streak in 
Calvin that sought to order within the minds of his followers the disorder engendered by the Fall 
leads to such equivocation.  Would not the rational reforming of the irrational, fallen mind be the 
type of agency predestinarian theology ostensibly argues against?  Bouwsma claims as much: 
Conceiving of sin as the result of the disorder of faculties ordered by nature and of 
salvation as the restoration of right order to the personality carried with it optimistic 
overtones of its classical origins hardly consistent with the doctrine of original sin.  It was 
doubtless possible to interpret the conception in such a way as to safeguard in theory a 
religion of grace.  But in practice the value it attached to the supposedly higher faculties 
of human beings encouraged belief in the possibility of reform by strengthening the mind 
through education and by moral effort.21 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 8. 
 
20 A.G. Dickens, The English Reformation, 2nd. ed., (University Park: Penn State Press, 
1989), 224. 
 
21 William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth-Century Portrait (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 81. 
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English Calvinists imported this equivocation on the active will in form of the doctrine of 
voluntarism, insofar as “voluntarism (faith as an act of the will in contrast to a passive persuasion 
in the mind) gained ascendancy in the Perkins tradition.”22  What these theologians developed in 
order to help the laity to cope with anxieties over election/reprobation was the idea of 
“preparation,” which “emerged as a rationale by which anxious souls could determine as soon as 
possible that they were not eternally damned [i.e., that they indeed had saving faith].”  With 
ascendance of the Perkins tradition in England, the lay Christian gained the ability to scrutinize 
himself as being either elect or reprobate: 
Preparation for faith … may be simply understood as the process by which a man 
becomes willing to believe [i.e., the data point to the fact that he is elect].  This process is 
to be seen largely as a function of God’s Law and is either that which may be included in 
the regeneration process but prior to faith, or prior to both regeneration and faith.  
Regeneration may be defined as the gift of saving faith which characterizes the elect 
alone, never the reprobate.  In other words, to know that one is regenerate is to know one 
is elected to salvation.23 
 
Far from its stereotype as a collective neurosis, Calvinist self-scrutiny represents a practical 
effort by theologians to help believers obtain evidence by which to assess one’s worth within a 
profoundly pessimistic, anxiety-provoking model of existence.  In a quite telling turn of phrase, 
Perkins defines the knowledge of saving faith as “experimental” knowledge; the empirical 
implication of testability is not anachronistic or accidental.  Such “experimenting” was 
performed with aid of the “practical syllogism,” a form of theological reasoning used for 
purposes of assurance.  If the Christian asks himself whether or not he believes earnestly and 
after close scrutiny that he has been given saving faith, and answers yes, then this itself is 
                                                 
22 Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 3. 
 
23 Ibid., 5. 
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evidence that he is elect.  As Kendall has it, “the method of achieving assurance of salvation is to 
scrutinize the claim of faith in oneself; if found to be true, the conclusion follows that one has 
saving [rather than temporary] faith.”24  Being the experimenter allowed the English Calvinist a 
certain degree of agency to define where he stands before God he otherwise would not have had. 
Yet all of this leads to a telling paradox: in both cases, the courtier and the Calvinist are 
striving to be what they (ideologically or doctrinally) already are.  Careful maneuvering and self-
posturing become equally essential to both, and it is in how to inhabit these highly unstable 
ideological and doctrinal positions that we find the greatest performative overlap between 
Calvinism and courtesy theory.  In the strain of English Calvinism described above, self-
improving labor (indeed all matters involving the active will) is reconceptualized as active 
contemplation; “scrutinizing the claim of faith in oneself” as a function of the active will in 
effect argues into existence a regenerate, and thus self-evidently elect, Christian.  The ingrained 
faculty of the discernment of regeneration actively argues, through the doctrine voluntarism, for 
the equally ingrained status of election; assurance thus rests on the active will “discovering” (in 
reality arguing for the fact) that one belongs to the rank of the elect.  As we shall see, it is this 
process’s emphasis on discernment and self-scrutiny that allows it to be aligned with the 
argument for the capacity of aesthetic discernment in Puttenham. 
Poetic Conduct in Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy and Herbert’s Temple 
 I noted in the introduction how Puttenham is beneficial for reading The Temple insofar as 
aesthetic discernment in The Art is analogous with regard to Herbert’s argument for assurance: 
Herbert cannot codify the rules by which to gauge election (no such universal rules exist that 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 9 
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would work to assure the Christian in his particular situation, as it is his own responsibility to 
search for signs of election).  Puttenham will show how this theologically motivated dictum 
against rule making is also militated against by an ambitious poetic context; in face of the ruling 
dictum of sprezzatura (hiding the labor of artful speech behind a pretense of ease), the writer 
must not look like he is having to resort to rules, aesthetic or otherwise, because doing so would 
seem laborious, and fail for that reason.  Puttenham’s explanation of decorum by use of example 
allows instances of decorum to be ascertained and scrutinized — purportedly if one has the right 
amount of discernment already, but also due in large part to the skill involved in recounting and 
constructing the example.  Puttenham thus dissembles labor by exporting it to the discerning 
faculty of his readers (he is simply recounting highly relevant examples). 
Before exploring this overlap between Puttenham and Herbert’s formal methods, recent 
charges of the inaccuracy of Puttenham’s work on courtesy theory, made convincingly by Steven 
W. May, need to be addressed.  Since the rationale of this essay is that Puttenham’s version of 
courtesy theory has much to bring to the table in assessing the influence of courtesy theory in 
general on Herbert’s poetics, that version must retain some degree of accuracy in theorizing 
courtly conduct.  Such accuracy, May asserts, is absent from Puttenham’s work entirely.  May’s 
argument suggests that, because Puttenham was a rake and a fugitive whom the court took pains 
to keep at distance, he had no basis on which to make his claims about the Elizabethan court, and 
thus no clout to advise anyone as to matters of courtly conduct.  As May has it, “This new 
understanding of Puttenham’s actual, out-of-court career, is grounded in the historical record 
rather than his self-representation in The Art.  It substantially alters our interpretation of all the 
12 
 
writings attributed to him.”25  While Puttenham certainly had access to the literature made by and 
for courtiers disseminated throughout England, May vitiates the question of indirect influence 
quite succinctly: “courtiership by osmosis is, moreover, untenable over and above the fact that 
Puttenham failed to parlay the advice set forth in The Art into his own promotion at court.”26  
Puttenham’s version of courtship thus looks to be quite useless.  However, the operative word 
here may be version.  If the paradigmatic situation that made up the court was one of 
“asymmetrical power relations between audience and performer… and the reification and sale of 
personal image,”27 then Puttenham seems to have understood this aspect of courtesy quite well; 
if literary history counts for anything here, dissembling is something Puttenham mastered.  May 
also cites the fact that Puttenham never actively sought to be a part of the Elizabethan court as 
another indication of his unreliability.28  According to Whigham, however, most courtiers took 
directions from the “imaginative projection of the ultimate Other who ‘knows what he is doing’”: 
“the typical courtier’s dominant Other will be the embodiment of a nonexistent ‘public opinion,” 
readable in mirroring responses of witnesses but dangerously evanescent.  In fact, no one is in 
charge here.”29  This raises the question of who really knew what was going on.  Ultimately, 
though, what May implies is that direct access to the Elizabethan court is a precondition for 
explaining it, which makes scholarship on the subject a strangely self-defeating activity.  To the 
                                                 
25 Steven May, “George Puttenham’s Lewd and Illicit Career,” Texas Studies in 
Literature and Language 50, no. 2 (2008): 160. 
 
26 Ibid., 163 
 
27 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 32 
 
28 May, “Puttenham’s Lewd and Illicit Career,” 160. 
 
29 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 39 
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court we might ascribe the platitude that human behavior is consistently inconsistent, and that 
first-hand knowledge has no special claim to reliability.  Julia Lamb, on the other hand, argues 
that the court functions more like dramatic scenery in The Art, bringing “contextuality itself to 
bear on rhetoric, allowing Puttenham to picture particular kinds of human activity: duplicity, 
subterfuge, and ambiguity.”30  Why this is important to a study on Herbert is that he as well, I am 
arguing, is someone who intuited the rules of courtesy without ever being, or perhaps ever 
wanting to be a courtier.31  In the end, both Puttenham and Herbert wanted to teach their readers 
about equally mysterious topics, and it should be kept in mind that teachers are often not the best 
practitioners of their respective arts.   
Two other reasons why we should consider what Puttenham has to say about courtesy are 
in fact suggested by May’s reading.  The first is that May presents Puttenham as a failure, (in 
short, that “Puttenham’s revised biography as it emerges from this newly available evidence 
differs substantially from his received image as a savvy and experienced courtier”32), which 
overlaps with the insecure Calvinist in need of assurance to the degree that he must find a way to 
theorize and mobilize a self-conceived, conceptually-driven account of conduct (rather than one 
that is experientially attested to from the vantage point of success), the perks of which Puttenham 
must in some way have intuited he could not possibly achieve.  The second point (related to the 
                                                 
30 Julia Lamb, “A Defense of Puttenham’s Arte of English Poesy,” English Literary 
Renaissance 39, no. 1 (2009): 28. 
 
31 For the controversy surrounding whether or not Herbert sought or failed to gain higher 
office (or even, like Donne, sought rectorship for its possibility of advancement), see Helen 
Wilcox, ODNB, “George Herbert,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 4-6. 
 
32 May, “Puttenham’s Lewd and Illicit Career,” 160. 
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first) is Puttenham’s reliance on the observation of the conduct of foreign courts: “It must be 
noted, however, that the author does qualify, if not undercut wholesale, the professed familiarity 
with the English court” due to a purported “broad knowledge of continental courts.”33  While this 
does not help to legitimate the points Puttenham makes about the specific nature of the English 
court, it speaks to an attempt by Puttenham to present a general theory of decorum.  This 
intention is evidenced by his statement that “decencies are of sundry sorts”; such a picture of 
“decencie” resists theorizing of the specific sort that would make his document more historically 
accurate, but such specificity would also also make it The Art much less interesting, as it would 
then fail to account for decorum as a universal phenomenon that translates itself across countries 
and time periods — and, furthermore, between ostensibly incompatible ideologies like Calvinism 
and Renaissance courtship.  
 Such a generalized picture of courtly conduct has been used with regard to Herbert by 
Schoenfeldt, who argues that Herbert seeks to show the “insidious consequences of aligning 
behavior towards heavenly authority with actual courtly practice.”34  I hope to show in what 
follows that Herbert’s formal method (Schoenfeldt speaks only of content) is productively 
conversant with Puttenham’s version of courtesy theory.  The reasoning, as we have seen, is 
theological: the constricting dictum which Puttenham foregrounds in Herbert is the doctrinal 
obviation of good works by justifying faith.  According to Strier, Herbert himself knew well this 
doctrine’s restrictive and counterintuitive nature: “Like Luther, Calvin, and all the strict 
maintainers of their theology, Herbert knew that the doctrine of grace alone was almost 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 164. 
 
34 Schoenfeldt, Prayer and Power, 22. 
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impossible to keep sharply and constantly in focus; he knew that the belief that it merely 
advocated an internalized form of work would always haunt it.”35  As we have seen, the English 
Calvinists, with which Herbert likely identified insofar as he also identified with basic Lutheran 
doctrine, argued for the active will as an operator in the act of self-scrutiny.  So far, this dances 
around a central issue: like courtly sprezzatura, Reformation Christianity needed to obscure its 
own special kind of labor behind doctrinal rhetoric.36  The way Puttenham achieves something 
similar is found in Lamb’s account of Puttenham’s method of using examples.  According to 
Lamb, the Art of English Poesy simply reasserts the purposive nature of speech — which in her 
account implies teaching by example — because the rules of decorous speech and poetry can 
only be apprehended by acute discernment.37  This places Puttenham’s theory of “teaching” 
squarely in line with both Whigham and R. Malcolm Smuts, the latter of whom considers 
Herbert in light of contemporary aesthetics, specifically that favored by the Renaissance art 
connoisseur.  Puttenham should be considered, that is, from the overlapping perspectives of both 
of the connoisseur and the courtier.  Teaching a poetics of conduct requires the gentleman to be 
“a discerning student of mankind, adept at reading the spiritual makeup of individuals though 
their expressions and gestures,”38 which overlaps with the discerning faculty of reading one’s 
                                                 
35 Love Known, 70. 
 
36 “In classical rhetoric the genus tenue was not a style devoid of artistry; rather it was 
characterized by hidden craftsmanship, by a subdued degree of ornament compatible with its 
emphasis on clarity and its conversational manner” (my italics). Michael P. Gallagher, “Rhetoric, 
Style, and George Herbert,” ELH 37, no. 4 (1970): 496.  Sprezzatura thus has at least oblique 
connections to Christian rhetoric’s adoption of the classical plain style. 
 
37 Lamb, “A Defense,” 34. 
 
38 R. Malcolm Smuts, Court Culture and the Origins of a Royalist Tradition in Early 
Stuart England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), 159. 
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courtly audience for signs of favor or disfavor.39  For Puttenham, this discernment is not 
something that can be captured by rules.  Puttenham considers it a natural faculty that requires 
simply being called to mind rather than argued for directly or codified.  As Lamb asserts, 
The trajectory of the Arte toward the formalization of a uniquely English art of poetry is 
deeply paradoxical in that it both presupposes an existing level of formalization in actual 
use (from which this art is to be drawn), and emphasizes a need for that art to be 
consciously and conscientiously (re)asserted by poets.  In thus formalizing in an 
instructional manual those rules already operative in English poetic practice, Puttenham 
aims to configure existing use into a usable entity, one by which poets may operate with 
greater purposiveness and intent.40 
 
It is this “greater purposiveness and intent,” communicated explicitly in The Art, which 
makes The Art so effective for exploring issues of conduct in Herbert.  Derek Attridge compares 
the presence of Puttenham’s labor in communicating issues of conduct and poetics against 
Sidney’s Defense of Poesie: whereas in the latter “tensions and contradictions tend to disappear 
under the immaculate surface of courtly sprezzatura,” Puttenham’s treatise does not put to use 
the “rhetorical and persuasive powers that are, in part, its subject.”41  Attridge’s main point is 
that there is a central contradiction in how Puttenham uses the terms “nature” and “art” — 
depending on whether poetry or conduct are praised for utilizing art to improve upon nature or 
for demonstrating mimetically nature’s excellence, “nature” and “art” can be interchangeably 
approbative or pejorative.  To this end, Whigham and Wayne A. Rebhorn state the following 
about Puttenham’s project:  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
39 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 38-39. 
 
40 Lamb, “A Defense,” 28. 
 
41 Derek Attridge, “Puttenham’s Perplexity: Nature, Art, and the Supplement in 
Renaissance Poetic Theory,” In Literary Theory/Renaissance Texts, Edited by Patricia Parker 
and David Quint, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 258. 
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Poetry is thus both like and unlike the crafts. The poet’s relation to measure [meter and 
proportion] links him with the craftsman, who is artful, even unnatural. When he speaks 
of another man’s doings… he works in a foreign material, as Puttenham says the painter 
and carver do. When he uses figures, argues subtly, persuades copiously and vehemently, 
he works like the cunning gardener, coadjutor with nature, furthering her conclusions, 
making them strange.42 
 
And yet, by contrast, Puttenham’s archetypal poet also works “by [nature’s] own peculiar virtue 
and proper instinct and not by example or meditation as all other artificers do”: 
In this case he is most admired when most natural and least artificial— yet to be honored 
for both (since language is both suggested by nature and polished by art), but more for 
avoiding the unseasonable artfulness, dissembling it well, than for grossly affecting and 
indiscreetly displaying it, “as many makers and orators do.”43 
 
The distinction here is quite similar to what distinguishes sprezzatura and affettazione in 
Castiglione.44  In dealing with upstart courtiers, the established courtier can seek to expose his 
rival as laboriously affected, whereas he himself comes by his manners naturally:45 
The courtier must at all times avoid affectation because it is a sign of labor. Two forms of 
attack on affectation can be distinguished. One sort of affectation is deceitful: the familiar 
false claim to a virtue or capacity one does not have…. But another kind of attack reveals 
knowledge as being exercised only with strain; this is a matter of trying too hard. Here 
the issue is not overt deceit but the stylistic virtue of self-management.46 
 
Like Puttenham himself, Attridge implies that, manifested by its lack of the “stylistic virtue of 
self-management,” The Art was “designed to fail.”47  I think it is perhaps more apt to say, 
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43 Ibid., 49. 
 
44 Whigham, Ambition and Privilege, 148. 
 
45 Ibid., 148. 
 
46 Ibid., 148. 
 
47 Ibid., 270. 
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however, that Puttenham demonstrates failure, whether it be a failure to dissemble labor in the 
fashion of sprezzatura, or, more importantly, a failure to hide the bivalent logic by which it 
functions.  Indeed, the contradictory presentation of “nature” and “art” (for which we could very 
easily substitute “faith” and “good works” in the Calvinist scheme) makes clear that something 
about what Puttenham calls the “rabble of scholastical precepts”48 in fact resists theory.  Nature, 
a phenomenon with the seemingly contradictory definitions of something essentially good and 
yet something that needs to be improved by art, captures Puttenham’s inclusiveness with regard 
to art’s variable definitions and capacities.  Victoria Kahn notes how exactly this “resistance to 
theory” motivates Puttenham’s treatment of decorum, and how this approach furthers his 
argument for active discernment of conduct: 
Puttenham’s recourse to examples in his discussion of decorum is instructive.  Just as 
prudence or decorum cannot defined once and for all in the form of ‘scholastical 
precepts’ but must instead be instanced in particular examples, so the author wishing to 
educate the reader’s judgment — to make that judgment more prudent or decorous — 
must also make use of examples.  Puttenham’s reflection on the resistance of decorum to 
theorizing … takes the form of a practice of examples of exemplary practice, on the 
assumption that such examples will involve the reader in a practice of interpretation 
which is essential for the active life.49 
 
That is, resistance to theory, doctrine, rules, etc. is proportional to how much the reader is 
involved in the text, which argues implicitly that the reader gets out of Puttenham’s examples 
that “brought with them no doctrine or institution”50 exactly what he puts in.  Here Puttenham 
might actually obscure in one stroke both his own inadequacies and labor by skirting the issue, 
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49 Victoria Kahn, “Humanism and the Resistance to Theory,” In Literary 
Theory/Renaissance Texts, Edited by Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986), 377-78. 
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pointing implicitly to the reader’s discernment as the questionable artifact rather than his text — 
all of which emphasizes the importance of the reader’s discernment of “metrical speech 
corrected and reformed by discreet judgments.”51   
The argument for a displacement to the reader of the faculty of discernment can indeed 
be marshaled as evidence for Puttenham’s ignorance of the rules of conduct specific to the 
English court.  However, in doing so, he also signals the fact that he perhaps intuited the 
foundational role that ignorance of rules has, as Pierre Bourdieu claims, for accurate accounts of 
behavior: 
Even those forms of interaction seemingly most amenable to description in terms of 
“intentional transfer into the Other”, such as sympathy, friendship, or love, are dominated 
(as class homogamy attests), through the harmony of habitus [the generative principle of 
action that tends to reproduce regularities of the objective conditions in practice], that is 
to say, more precisely, the harmony of ethos and tastes … by the objective structure of 
the relations between social conditions.  The illusion of mutual election or predestination 
arises from the ignorance of the social conditions for the harmony of aesthetic tastes or 
ethical leanings, which is thereby perceived as evidence of the ineffable affinities which 
spring from it.52 
 
In other words, “ineffability” obtains when the objective factors in play cannot be adequately 
explained by the logical moves possible within the culture in which they are operative— any 
complex behavior, according to Bourdieu, is necessarily to some degree mysterious to the 
practitioner; thus Bourdieu’s definition of the habitus as “the source of these series of moves 
which are objectively organized as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic 
intention.”53  This in fact renders any project of codifying rules pointless, and makes the 
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52 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Translated by Richard Nice 
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53 Ibid., 73. 
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comprehensive description of situations all the more important: 
To eliminate the need to resort to “rules,” it would be necessary to establish in each case 
a complete description (which invocation of rules allows one to dispense with) of the 
relation between the habitus, as a socially constituted system of cognitive and motivating 
structures, and the socially structured situation in which the agents’ interests are defined, 
and with them the objective functions and subjective motivations of their practices.  It 
would then become clear that, as Weber indicated, the juridical or customary rule is never 
more than a secondary principle of the determination of practices, intervening when the 
primary principle, interest, fails.54 
 
How an author elucidates matters conduct thus becomes supremely important.  The fact that 
Puttenham either consciously seeks to obviate the need for or has no realistic option (as May has 
it) to codify “rules” of courtly conduct means that he must provide many comprehensive 
examples of decorous behavior in order to accurately map the subjective interests involved in 
accounting for the practice (rather than a theory) of courtesy.  In any case, this method at least 
intuits what Bourdieu has laid out above, that the observer of behavior must in some fashion 
account for the system of interlinked interests if he is to get at the subjective factors motivating 
that behavior as well as the objective motivating factors (nascent capitalism in Malcolmson’s 
account of the work ethic as it applies Herbert’s poetry, as we shall see below).  As Bourdieu 
argues, this means that an observer of conduct must come up with some kind of comprehensive 
description, which is exactly what Puttenham’s Art accomplishes.  In the introductory section of 
his lengthy chapter containing these examples, Puttenham states the following: 
The case then standing that discretion must chiefly guide all those businesses, since there 
be sundry sorts of discretion all unlike, even as there be men of action or art, I see no way 
so fit to enable a man truly to estimate decency as example….  But by reason of the 
sundry circumstances that man’s affairs are, as it were, wrapped in, this decency comes to 
be very much alterable and subject to variety, insomuch as our speech asketh one manner 
of decency in respect of the person who speaks, another of him to whom it is spoken, 
another of whom we speak, another of what we speak, and in what place and time and to 
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what purpose.  And as it is of speech, so of all other behaviors.  We will therefore set you 
down some few examples of every circumstance how it alters the decency of speech or 
action.55 
 
Puttenham is attempting to deal with familiar rhetorical concepts such as kairos (a sense of good 
timing) and, more importantly, phronesis (prudence or practical wisdom) that both obtain in 
cases of good speaking, both of which presuppose the variability of situations as a problem that 
needs to be dealt with by the speaker in order to communicate effectively or come across well to 
his audience.  Such practical wisdom has been theorized as far back as Aristotle, who makes 
perhaps the clearest connection of prudence to generality in the following passage from the 
Nicomachean Ethics: “It seems proper to a prudent person to be able to deliberate finely about 
things that are good and beneficial to himself, not about some restricted area — about what sorts 
of things promote health or strength, for instance — but about what sorts of things promote 
living well in general.”56 According to Aristotle, like theory or codification, prudence is an 
“intellectual virtue,” “but whereas theory includes the intelligence of first causes and the 
necessary and universal consequences, prudence is concerned with action within the realm of 
contingent human affairs.”57  Aristotle, Bourdieu, and Puttenham have all come to basically the 
same conclusion independently, that the “contingency of human affairs” elides the possibility of 
a rulebook for specific situations. 
 Herbert himself addresses this lack of recourse to rules in “Sinne” (1).  The sonnet is, 
initially, a catalog of protectives against sin, emphasized by the (perhaps ironic) first line, “Lord, 
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with what care hast thou begirt us round!”  These protectives are presented unambiguously as 
rules and laws: “Parents first season us: then schoolmasters / Deliver us to laws; they send us 
bound / To rules of reason” (2-4).  This proceeds to mature experiences of “Afflictions sorted, 
anguish of all sizes, / Fine nets and stratagems to catch us in” (6-7), progressing onward towards 
advanced theological rumination in the quatrain before the concluding couplet: 
Blessings beforehand, tyes of gratefulness, 
 The sound of glorie ringing in our eares: 
 Without, our shame; within, our consciences; 
Angels and grace, eternall hopes and fears.    (9-12) 
 
One can get the sense that the increasingly universal scope and high spiritual stakes mentioned 
here (culminating in the phrase “eternall hopes and fears”) outrank the now rather simple-
seeming instruction of “laws” and “rules of reason.”  As implied by the progression in age and/or 
maturity of the speaker, simple approaches are revealed to be supremely naïve when confronted 
with the vicissitudes of Christian experience (the “sound of glorie ringing in our ears” contrasted 
with “shame” and “consciences”; “Angels and grace” contrasted with “eternall hopes and 
fears”).  Of course, these are all, ostensibly, positive gestures: ruminating on one’s “eternall” 
status is equally instructive in Calvinist doctrine as contemplating “Angels and grace.”  Mature 
contemplation is not enough, however, as we see in the concluding couplet: “Yet all these fences 
and their whole aray / One cunning bosome-sinne blows quite away” (13-14).  The elaborate, 
systematic structures that defend one (metaphorized in the image of defensive military 
formation), be it in naive “rules” taught to schoolchildren or in careful and mature meditations on 
the balance of positive and negative behavioral reinforcements within Christian experience, are 
all blown “quite away” by “bosome-sinne,” the ingrained fallibility against which external 
defenses cannot protect.  This scenario goes back to Bourdieu’s notion of ineffability: one is 
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never given privileged access to the “larger” factors guiding behavior (whether they be material 
or, here, spiritual): like the sudden realization of the impropriety of these methods to defend 
against sin in “Sinne” (1), violation in matters of conduct are apprehended most often only in the 
act of violation. 
Herbert’s orientation towards following rules is also made summarily clear by his claim, 
appropriately in “The H. Scriptures” (II), for a close economy of the Word and individual 
experience:  
Such are thy secrets, which my life makes good, 
 And comments on thee: for in ev’ry thing 
 Thy words do finde me out, & parallels bring, 
And in another make me understood.   (9-12) 
 
The scriptures are an interpretive guide to multifaceted experience, but one that can only be 
borne out by experience (they are the “secrets, which my life makes good”).  One does not get 
the sense here of someone following rules, but rather assessing his behavior by comparing it  to a 
multitude of scriptural precedents (tantamount to assessing behavior by example in Puttenham).  
This also implies that Christianity’s basic standards of morality (whether it be the Decalogue or 
the more generalized imatatio Christi) are only fully understood or appreciated once they have 
been enacted and scrutinized.  That is, while scripture can most assuredly function normatively, 
as an assessment scripture becomes relevant only after particular actions to be assessed have 
already been carried out.  Such a process is ongoing; new, ambiguous situations inevitably arise.  
Vendler notes how Herbert relies on comprehensum rather than the individual datum, for which 
she means the interpretations of his poems rest in their finality, being understood as a whole58 — 
we can now add another sense of comprehensum to her definition (which perhaps already implies 
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it), that of included or contained.  Herbert’s corpus, that is, aims for comprehensiveness as well 
as variability.  
 The preceding argument should show Herbert addressing, in light of Puttenham’s account 
of courtesy, the issues of aristocratic taste and behavior as they relate to the basic pastoral 
problem of English Calvinism— the need for assurance.  Also, it should hopefully widen the 
scope of Fish’s initial insight about the rhetoricity of Herbert’s poems and the function of 
readerly attention, that Herbert’s poetics “is tied not to the structure of doctrine … but to the 
structure of the situation, and its goal is not the orderly disposition of a body of knowledge, but 
the arrival at that knowledge of a respondent who has come to it himself.”59  I would only add 
here that the structure of doctrine, insofar as it is mediated through English Calvinism, is better 
integrated into the rhetorical character of Herbert’s poetry than Fish seems to allow.  Yet if we 
are to fully understand Herbert’s method of assuring his reader, how exactly such readerly 
attention involves matters of taste that are analogous to the voluntarist discernment of election 
requires further explication. 
Protestant Poetics and the “Art” of Poetry 
The importance of the overlap between courtly and Calvinist decorum to Herbert is that, 
insofar as he seeks to teach as well as delight his reader with aesthetic excellence, he allows 
performative standards of poetic conduct to enter into a dialectic with the Protestant doctrine he 
aims to convey: how he manages the craft of his poetry, as an external formal object that is a 
soul’s exertion, may help determine how successful he is at establishing evidence for election, 
insofar as it places onus on the reader: doctrine is, in a sense, emphasized by the construction of 
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the of the poems as problematic formal objects.  In fact, disjunctions between the 
“constructedness” of Herbert’s poems that Vendler has demonstrated and their content constitute 
an internal critique that is the principal formal engine that so effectively drives home Herbert’s 
theological subject matter in the short space of the lyric poem.60  Like nature and art in 
Puttenham, poetry for Herbert is something that is both highly artificial (that is, a craft) and, 
insofar as Protestant theology stands for what is “natural” (i.e., unaffected) to Herbert, a 
“coadjutor with nature, furthering her conclusions.”  In his discussion of “Confession” and 
“Sinnes Round,” for instance, Strier notes how Herbert’s involuted style exhibits an internalized 
critique.  These poems, for instance, by engaging in a Lutheran attack on rational capacity, use 
“wit to attack wit”: the “witty conceits of these poems dramatize and exemplify sinister 
processes,” and so “Herbert is not exempting his own ingenuity from that he is attacking.”61  The 
basis for the mode of attack is exactly the thing being attacked; Herbert is thus using artifice to 
attack artifice (and in so doing emphasizes the doctrinal or, more loosely, the “natural”). 
 Of course, for “witty” attacks to seem genuine, as in any effective counterargument, 
                                                 
60  “The most sensitive and decorous expression of Caroline piety may be found in the 
works of George Herbert, whose poems display ‘the beauty of holiness’ more subtly and more 
persuasively than any of his contemporaries, recording the history of a soul that derives profound 
comfort from the liturgy, rituals and symbolism of the Anglican Church.” Graham Parry, The 
Golden Age Restor’d: The Culture of the Stuart Court, 1603-42 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1981), 246. Herbert, according to Strier, while not a radical Protestant, would 
have been similarly uneasy about the established Church’s recourse to physical spaces in 
devotional practice instead of the revelation to the Spirit through the Word, as in stricter 
Lutheran and Calvinist strains; thus, Herbert is sympathetic with the radical impulse without 
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Herbert cannot risk attacking a straw man.  It should be admitted that the conceits Herbert 
deconstructs often do seem contrived and convenient, and furthermore his amorous relationship 
with the poetic process is never in doubt.  Part of the risk Herbert takes is having both himself 
and his reader become so caught up in the aesthetic delights of his project that, as a method of 
assurance, its didacticism is overshadowed by its poetic grandeur.  By Herbert’s time, the beauty 
of the physical artifact was, in fact, a serious contender for the English gentleman’s attention, 
both in and out of Church.  While archbishop William Laud concerned himself with projects of 
decorating dilapidated Churches and restoring elegance to liturgical practices, secular art 
connoisseurship was itself making an influx from the continent; in Caroline England the secular 
and religious aesthetics naturally intermixed.  When speaking of Herbert’s artistic sensibility, 
similar to that which “disposed [Charles I] towards visual beauty in the services of his Church as 
a way of directing the senses to a religious end”,62 Graham Parry notes that 
Although the sensibility that informs these poems is uniquely Herbert’s, the ordered 
religious beauty in which they move was not entirely of Herbert’s making: it belonged to 
a tradition of decorous worship that was shaped by Hooker and refined by Lancelot 
Andrewes; William Laud would attempt to make it the dominant character of the 
Anglican Church, and it was certainly the mode of worship approved by King Charles.63 
 
An additional phenomenon of the time was the so-called “cult of the virtuoso,” a compensatory 
move on the part of would-be courtiers to redirect their energies in the face of professional 
failure.  Due to the fact that only a “diminishing minority could hope to find useful employment, 
there was a compelling need to find an emotionally satisfying alternative”64 in the form of “an 
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alternative outlet for their surplus time, energy, and wealth” dilettantism provided.65  There is 
more to be said about the virtuoso as it applies to Puttenham (although his output, as with 
Herbert’s, certainly exceeds the aesthetic standards of the aristocrat dilettante).  With Herbert, it 
is more important to note that virtuosic performance and genuine appreciation of artistic 
ingenuity were prevailing attitudes that are thrown into the mix with his devotional subject 
matter.  Herbert, in this context, would seem to be constantly balancing the aesthetic and the 
thematic, perhaps only to note its provisional character in orienting, like the Word, the Christian 
toward individual revelation.66 
 These aesthetic considerations might militate somewhat against the riskiness of the 
dialectic which Herbert opens up between the aesthetic and the thematic, noted above.  Such 
danger is one Herbert often thematized, and more than one critic has commented on the often 
quite dramatic reversals which occur in his poems, diminishing somewhat the complexity of the 
poetic conceits Herbert has erected with such care for the purposes of demonstrating that 
imagery’s doctrinal incompatibility.  Puttenham would call this an instance of metanoia: 
Otherwhiles we speak and be sorry for it, as if we had not well spoken, so that we seem 
to call in our word again and to put in another fitter for the purpose, for which respects 
the Greeks called this manner of speech the Figure of Repentance; then, for that upon 
repentance commonly follows amendment, the Latins called it the figure of Correction 
[correctio], in that the speaker seemeth to reform that which was said amiss.67 
 
Strier has often pointed out the tendency in Herbert’s poems both for “the visual and the 
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semantic” to “be at odds”68 and for the conclusion “to blow everything that preceded it ‘quite 
away.’”69  Speaking about “The Altar,” Strier locates this motive in Herbert’s theological 
uneasiness with visual representation (ekphrasis). 
But why, in a poem so deeply distrustful of craft, one that invokes perhaps the most 
powerful anti-craft moment in the Hebrew bible [the injunction against erecting an altar 
with hewn stone], would the poem want to ascribe a tour-de-force of ostentatious poetic 
art to God? Herbert has already distinguished himself, as a person, from the poem (“if I 
chance to hold my peace”), and we have noted that the “frame” could be his body. The 
altar that he truly cares about is not the perfect classical altar of the physical poem but the 
“broken altar” that God, through His unique transforming power, has produced within his 
spiritual being.70 
 
Strier here explains much about the ambiguous relationship between form and content in “The 
Altar” and other poems like it; while he notes that “The Altar” could have just as likely been 
written by a Puritan iconoclast, he also makes clear that a more complex reading of Herbert’s 
orientation toward materiality has more to do with excessive attachment to a physical object, 
here called to mind by the physical shape of the poem itself: 
A broken ALTAR, Lord, thy servant reares, 
Made of a heart, and cemented with teares: 
  Whose parts are as thy hand did frame; 
  No workman’s tool hath trouch’d the same. 
         A HEART alone 
         Is such a stone, 
         As nothing but 
       Thy pow’r doth cut. 
       Wherefore each part 
       Of my hard heart 
       Meets in this frame, 
       To praise thy name: 
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  That, if I chance to hold my peace, 
  These stones to praise thee may not cease. 
O let thy blessed SACRIFICE be mine, 
And sanctifie this ALTAR to be thine. 
 
The fault in such excessive attachment to the “visual” appeal of “The Altar” or to the form of 
Herbert’s poems in general, in Strier’s mind, lies in the fact that it privileges the formal over the 
semantic: “The poem is certainly going to raise the issue of sacrifice, and equally certainly going 
to raise the question of the status and value of poetic art, but we must read the words of the poem 
to know what [“The Altar”] is saying about these things.”71  The first lines, “A broken Altar, 
Lord, thy servant reares, / Made of a heart, and cemented with tears” (1-2), for instance, speak of 
an altar entirely distinct from the poetic altar spoken of as a “frame” built by Herbert mentioned 
in line eleven.  Instead, the altar that is the subject of the poem is nonphysical,  “Made of a heart, 
and cemented with teares” (2) — and moreover it is one “Whose parts are as thy hand did frame” 
(3), which displaces the true altar-building agency to God.  When the altar is mentioned again in 
the final line, “And Sanctifie this Altar to be thine” (16), we are not sure to which altar Herbert is 
referring.  Strier argues that, for the poem’s ambiguity be rendered coherent, the physical poetic 
altar must at this moment point away from itself and toward the inward “broken altar” “that God, 
through His unique transforming power, has produced within [Herbert’s] spiritual being.” 
Finally, the poem as artifact persists only to ensure ongoing praise: “That, if I chance to hold my 
peace, / These stones to praise thee may not cease.”  Rather than utilizing the aere perennius 
trope, Herbert “is merely claiming that [the poem] will continue to exist, and to say what it is 
saying.”72 
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What Strier points to as the ambiguity between semantics and form in “The Altar” also 
foregrounds the usefulness of Herbert’s aesthetics to the general problem of Christian assurance 
in a way that is doctrinally sound.  That is, assurance is written formally into his poems by 
allowing the anxious Christian to engage with them aesthetically by utilizing his own 
discernment in the act of reading.  But, because this is a seemingly passive process on the part of 
the author that obscures the doctrinal intention behind it (showing the “corrections” to the poetry 
and not rendering his poem in a “final” draft form), poetic labor is effectively dissembled.  
Depending on the condition of its receiver, a Herbert poem can perform both kinds of work, 
aesthetic and doctrinal, while at the same time seeming not to.  The bitter pill of Christian 
anxiety is thus sweetened by a method that reveals the close economy of doctrine and matters of 
taste.   Also, to reiterate, there is the fact that the extensive number of elaborate, highly imagistic 
conceits offer a catalog of poetic situations that comprise a “complete description” of the various 
interlinked subjective interests within the objective condition of that poetry’s reception — they 
are Herbert’s version of Puttenham’s examples, which show Christian “decencies of sundry 
sorts” rendered formally as well as thematically in his poetry.  Because rules for Christian 
behavior are always secondary to the subjective experience of living as a Christian, an 
adequately mimetic Protestant poetics would have to account for the variability (including, as we 
have seen, the fallibility) of such experience.  Why Herbert accomplishes such an accurate poetic 
representation of Christian experience is due to the fact that he builds into his poetry conceits 
like that of “The Altar,” the form of which being in the shape of an altar complicates the poems 
argument for a “broken altar,” and which therefore necessitates the reader to be a highly 
cognizant of how its form and content are aligned or misaligned (he must choose which altar, the 
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poem or the one the poem speaks of, is more apposite to Herbert’s purpose in writing).  These 
kinds of scenarios, when taken together, form a corpus that, while conversant with Protestant 
doctrine, are not explicitly doctrinal in their presentation, in the sense that they do not say how 
they should be interpreted or which interpretations are to be privileged — “The Altar,” for 
instance, can be interpreted as facilely coherent or ambiguous, with only an astute, doctrinally-
informed reader perhaps recognizing the ambiguity (and, I believe, its argument for ambiguity in 
matters involving Christian experience) inherent in presenting an argument for a “broken” altar 
within a poetic altar that is architecturally sound.  To get at doctrinal incompatibility in “The 
Altar,” it would seem to follow that the reader must have the right degree of aesthetic 
discernment to recognize firstly its formal virtuosity; that is, to recognize the argument for 
ambiguity in the “The Altar,” one must be highly attendant to matters of form and poetics (a 
learned fascination with “shape poems,” to which Puttenham dedicates much space in The Art, 
would be of much help, for example).  To the degree that poetics here implies doctrinal matters, 
the learned reader would be “lead” to a “correct” reading of the ambiguity — a kind of tacit 
argument for assurance that, by involving aesthetic judgment, bends rather than breaks the rule 
that election must be internally revealed.  This is to say that, as much as Herbert tests his reader, 
he also tests poetic art itself as an appropriate vehicle for doctrinal matters: like Christian 
experience, poetry is a medium wherein doctrine is instanced, rather than explained.  And, as 
Bourdieu makes clear, if something cannot be codified, a complete description of practice must 
be invoked; in Herbert, this means that there must be many instances of poetic accounts of 
doctrinal matters to account for the variability inherent to the experience of living according to 
the Law.   
To this end, I think that, in addition to Strier’s reading of “The Altar,” another is 
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suggested that does not so completely do away with the importance of visual representation and 
its concomitant dependence upon poetic performance.  The printing history of “The Altar” 
suggests that its shape has functioned quite effectively as an attention-getter from the start, a 
fascination with its visual representation evidenced by increasingly elaborate emphases by 
printers of its architectural qualities.73  Had he lived longer, Herbert might have bemoaned such 
formulations as indicative of a widespread misinterpretation of the poem’s calculated 
inconsistency of the altar existing as poetic artifact and the broken altar of the heart to which the 
poem alludes.  As it stands, however, such attention to its form has been a factor in allowing it to 
continue to “say what it is saying.”  There is much critical literature that would argue that this is 
not accidental on the part of Herbert.  Vendler, for instance, has argued that contradictory 
elements coexist in Herbert’s poetry in order to better align it with the idea, given doctrinal 
emphasis in Christian theology, that “logic is fallible”; in effect, Herbert transforms human 
fallibility into a procedural assumption on which to base his poetics:  
[Herbert] is constantly criticizing what he has already written, and he often finds the 
original conception inadequate, whether the original conception be the Church’s, the 
Bible’s, or his own.  Nothing is exempt from his critical eye, when he is at his best, and 
there is no cliché of religious expression or personal experience that he does not reject 
after being tempted into expressing it.74   
 
“The Altar” is perhaps the ideal candidate for such a consideration of Herbert’s poetry.  The 
astute reader might assume that Herbert originally conceived the shape of “The Altar” as a witty 
                                                 
73 See Hutchinson’s commentary on “The Altar”: “The poem, as written in the MSS. and 
printed in 1633, follows the shape of a classical altar.  From 1634 to 1667 the shape is further 
emphasized by lines drawn around the poem.  The lines are replaced from 1674 by an engraving 
of a full-length Christian altar under a classical canopy, with the poem set under the canopy.” 
The Works of George Herbert, 484.  Hutchinson also observes that the altar as written is a 
classical rather than Christian altar. 
 
74 Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 29. 
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poetic conceit before realizing its incompatibility with Christian doctrine.  In this picture, “The 
Altar” cannot be ekphrastic or unambiguously doctrinal because to be either would obviate the 
fallibility its formalism represents, namely that we must move past the “failure” of an ostensibly 
physical altar to fully appreciate its contrast with the Protestant doctrinal altar of the heart.  
While Herbert cannot ascribe the aesthetic object to God’s hand, the implication here that Strier 
omits is that Herbert wants the ascription of a virtuosic formal object to the poet himself to be as 
explicit as possible.  This is still in line with Reformation doctrine: man inevitably fails to 
measure up theologically to God the architect of the heart; Herbert’s altar may be ingenious, but 
God’s is incomparable.  However, the incapacity to erect a proper altar does not mean his is 
unimportant (it is, in fact, similar to the function of the Word in individual revelation that Strier 
notes elsewhere: it is the text to which the heart aligns itself).  Being a virtuosic poet, however, 
provides the most start illustration of human fallibility: “The Altar” argues not only that 
overemphasizing materiality, such as that belonging to an aesthetic object, is a mistake, but that a 
craftsman as brilliant as Herbert can make it.  Herbert transforms aesthetic success into doctrinal 
failure, but, inasmuch as consciousness of that failure is essential in a Calvinist doctrinal context, 
that failure in turn becomes a useful Protestant poetic device. 
Herbert is not the only one, however, to perceive the theological importance of 
“correction” in matters of poetic conduct.  Metanoia also carries its own theological connotations 
in Puttenham, for, as the “Figure of Repentance,” it emphasizes the ethical and pedagogical 
imperative of his ideal of poetic conduct.  In his analysis of “Love Unknown,” Ira Clark connects 
the figure to Herbert: “Herbert's dialogue/agon in which God (or the Friend) corrects the 
rebellious persona in order to save him seems to be carried on in a probe and expansion of 
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metanoia or correctio,” the rhetorical figure of “making straight” or “setting right.” 75  He goes 
on: 
It is critically significant that Puttenham returns to the primary Greek meaning of the 
figure—the repentant. For the repentant emphasizes imitation, as most rhetorical figures 
must initially have been thought to be reflections, of a psychic state in the speaker. 
Furthermore, this particular psychic condition contains a serious pun on a sacred human 
condition. In describing a rhetorical figure Puttenham is more importantly discussing a 
crucial event for the Christian psyche; he emphasizes that the repentant reflects the 
anguish attending recognition of a sin as well as the corrective revelatory afterthought.76 
 
Clark has begun to note the deeper connection between Herbert’s poetic form and his poetics of 
conduct.  To get at how exactly this device illuminates the process behind Herbert’s intention to 
help the lay Christian through his poetry, we must first get beyond thinking of metanoia as a 
complete reversal of poetic intention and consider how, in light of the doctrinal restrictions 
elucidated above, Herbert’s corrections can be viewed as a coherent, theologically informed 
strategy that argues for assurance.  As it stands now, form simply rallies attention in order to 
divest itself of meaning (and any prideful claims).77   
 Vendler once more suggests a productive way of viewing the formal elements of the 
poem that are “left in” (various maneuvers and revisions that might be corrected in a final draft 
by another poet) as integral to the final argument of Herbert’s poems.  I made the claim that 
Herbert is just as fixated on the process as the final result, but to get at this we must first 
foreground why and in what form poetic process could be especially beneficial to offering the 
                                                 
75 Ira Clark, “‘Lord, In Thee the Beauty Lies in the Discovery’: ‘Love Unknown’ and 
Reading Herbert,” ELH 39, no. 4 (1972), 578. 
 
76 Ibid., 578. 
 
77 “In losing the poem Herbert also loses, happily, the prideful claims it made silently in 
his name, and in this way he makes of its writing an act no less self-diminishing than the 
experience it records and provides.”  Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts, 215.  
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reader assurance that he can make similar internal reform, reorienting himself to perhaps better 
perceive God’s grace.  Part of this project, Vendler allows us to see, involves Herbert’s 
prioritizing of emotion over reason:  
Intellectuality alone, as in texts of controversy, was of no interest to Herbert: rather, as 
we can tell from Divinitie and other poems, he thought it positively dangerous insofar as 
it was likely to distract from feeling.  No sentiment is more unequivocally expressed and 
more constantly affirmed in this work than the absolute primacy of lived experience over 
abstraction.78 
 
The preference for lived experience rather than abstraction will be crucial later.  What should be 
noted now is how this preference manifests itself in Herbert’s lyric process: 
That interior work of seeing life accurately which must, at least in logical priority, 
precede accurate expression is particularly evident in Herbert, and is sometimes not even 
complete before the poem begins; the refining and purifying continue even as the poem is 
actually being constructed.  Before the notion or experience is written down, much has 
happened in the way of analysis, scrutiny, refusal, comparison, and testing.79 
 
Vendler’s claim that Herbert emphasizes emotion and lived experience over abstraction (for 
which we can read doctrine) does two things: first, it prioritizes in Herbert exactly the same 
operation that the lay Christian would be urged to perform when using the practical syllogism of 
the experimental predestinarians (“analysis, scrutiny, refusal, comparison, and testing,” my 
italics); second, it urges us to contend with the Calvinist scrutiny of lived experience on aesthetic 
rather than neurotic or other generally negative terms.  One might even view such scrutiny as an 
internalization of connoisseurship culture as it applies to Christian experience, as the ability to 
discern the elegance of Christian existence, even if such experience is ultimately qualified by a 
spiritualism that to some degree must reject worldly things.  It must be said that the kind of 
aesthetic appreciation native to a culture of connoisseurship — the craft of devotional poetry, 
                                                 
78 Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 6. 
 
79 Ibid., 7. 
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religious art, etc. being appreciated for its own sake — is not unlike the testability of faith in the 
English Calvinist paradigm: to know the good is just to intuit that it is so, the theological 
analogue of which is what is called the “reflex act” in predestinarian theology.  According to 
Kendall, Protestant divines call the reflex act of faith any by which the “knowledge of faith is the 
‘conclusion’ deduced by its effects.”80  Assurance, therefore, is intimately related to but not 
identical with acts of faith; like the formal features of a Herbert poem, it is a vehicle rather than a 
tenor, something performed largely for the purposes of being scrutinized.  The importance of the 
reflex act here is twofold: it foregrounds action as having evidentiary status and, because of the 
careful economy between faith and works implied by this account of the testability of faith, it 
argues that assurance should be considered both an exterior as well as interior phenomenon, 
physical artifacts being something externally concrete the anxious spirit can latch itself onto for 
purposes of assurance.  Such a conception is conversant with Beza’s more “active” version of 
Calvinism Perkins introduced into England: “Beza directs us not to Christ but to ourselves, 
which points us back, as it were, to the decree of election.”  Thus, while “Calvin thinks that 
looking to ourselves leads to anxiety, or sure damnation, Beza thinks otherwise.  Sanctification, 
or good works, is the infallible proof of saving faith.”81  Beza seems to take advantage of the 
equivocation noted above on the part of Calvin that relates back to the question of the active will 
with regard to faith, in effect widening Perkin’s doctrine of saving faith to include a limited 
doctrine work (the internal form of work that Strier points out).  Saving faith — that is, faith 
revealed to be “saving” by active scrutiny of the claim of having it — is based on the Christian’s 
                                                 
80 Kendall, Calvin and English Calvinism, 33. 
 
81 Ibid., 33. 
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orientation not only toward matters concerning a passive aesthetic appreciation of religious 
artifacts or lived Christian experience, but also toward artifacts of secular vocation, both of 
which would be on the mind at some point of an aristocratic gentleman such as Herbert.  
(Vocation also further raises the question of active self-improvability — “every hour, every 
moment things have to be thought through again, and the surface of the heart must be renewed, 
quickened, mended, suppled,”82 as Vendler puts it.) 
 Malcolmson addresses both issues of vocation and doctrinal intent in her work on the 
Protestant ethic’s influence on Herbert.  If we are to consider Herbert’s reader as an aristocrat, 
influenced equally by the aesthetic and religious paradigms outlined above, Malcolmson’s 
treatment of Herbert as writing to a “select, elite group” is particularly helpful in hypothesizing 
such an audience.  She terms Herbert’s mode of writing to aristocratic intimates “coterie verse,” 
a mode of witty, poetic debate where poems are answered with poems in order to show off wit 
and to demonstrate one’s belonging to the same class as the poet one is answering.  Malcolmson 
cites as evidence for Herbert’s participation in this type of poetic mode his “sacred parody” of 
the prior work of his relative, Philip Sidney, as well as the fact that the “Sidney-Herbert clan” 
would have been involved in a “reciprocal exchange of patronage, support and hospitality” in 
return for shows of respect and loyalty.83  In Macolmson’s mind, Herbert’s poetry is best 
understood as having been written in the context of such a patronage network: 
Because of Herbert’s upper-class status, he withheld most of his poetry from commercial 
publication during his lifetime.  I believe that he regularly presented his devotional lyrics 
to a select, elite group.  Some critics have argued that Herbert’s English lyrics were not 
known to others in any significant way until the publication of The Temple after his death 
                                                 
82 Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 29. 
 
83 Malcolmson, Heart-Work, 47. 
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in 1633.  Underlying these arguments is the assumption that social performance within a 
patronage network and the expression of religious conviction are mutually exclusive.84 
 
As we have seen, Protestant doctrine and some degree of self-improvement can be placed in a 
rather easy economy with one another.  Malcolmson extends this logically to include overt self-
advancement of the kind seen in courtesy theory.  She further grounds this point by noting that 
Herbert’s purported circulation of lyrics would serve precisely this purpose in the context of 
“poetic debate,” in which answering a poem with a witty poetic response functioned to “request 
entrance into the upper-class circle that had produced it and to take on that coterie’s air of 
gentility.”  Religious poetry thus served the function of gentility-making.  Central to gentility-
making is poetry’s epideictic function, that the “point of the debate was to demonstrate one’s 
verbal skills, not to express a personal opinion” — skills learned by aristocrats of Herbert’s kind 
at the  “universities and the Inns of Court.”  Thus, we must consider The Temple, according to 
Malcolmson, “not as a set of private meditations but as part of Herbert’s lifelong performance 
within the Herbert circle.”85 
 The main advantage of Malcolmson’s treatment of Herbert to the current study is that it 
identifies a plausible context for the reception for Herbert’s poetry where it can perform work 
beyond a strictly personal, devotional capacity — that is, for The Temple to help any “dejected 
poor soul,” as Herbert is reported to have said about his corpus close to his death.86  Also 
important here is the emphasis on poetic performance as a kind of conduct, a behavior that is 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 48. 
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86 Izaak Walton, Lives of John Donne, Henry Wotton, Rich’d Hooker, George Herbert, 
&c., Volume Two. (1898; Project Gutenberg, 2004) http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/13139 
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meant to be scrutinized by others for one’s personal benefit.  While I find particularly interesting 
and instructive Malcolmson’s extension of Herbert’s poetics to account for modes of self-
advancement, I find problematic her implied disjunction between Herbert’s formal virtuosity and 
the religious content of his poems.  While Malcolmson would certainly agree that the content of 
Herbert’s poetry is religious, any kind of devotional intention is rendered secondary in her 
reading in favor of motivations involving personal rivalry within Herbert’s coterie.87   I think that 
when Malcolmson makes clear that “the assumption that social performance within a patronage 
network and the expression of religious conviction are mutually exclusive” is incorrect in the 
sense that Herbert’s devotional poetry can advance one’s position even as it expresses deeply felt 
religious convictions, she in fact implies an aristocratic, religious sphere where both the 
ambitious and Calvinist anxieties surrounding one’s status can in fact be ameliorated.  If 
Herbert’s coterie was equally conversant with both theological anxiety and the social pressure of 
ambition and privilege, Herbert’s Temple might very well have done good work even as its 
poems were disseminated to benefit Herbert’s own social standing.  In fact, if those in his coterie 
were indeed involved in circulating religious poetry, the rivalrous atmosphere would perhaps 
function to catalyze the revelation of personal religious conflicts that might have been 
ameliorated by Herbert’s ostensibly self-advancing responses.  That this ameliorative process is 
actually the prime motivator for Herbert is hinted at by his firm standing in the Herbert-Sidney 
coterie, which would perhaps have obviated the need for gentility-making of the kind which 
                                                 
87 “I agree with Strier that Herbert does not have the attitude toward the world implicit in 
Christian humanism, but Strier’s consideration of ‘The Church-porch’ and ‘The Elixer’ in the 
context of humanism rather than the doctrine of vocation allows him to exaggerate Herbert’s 
ultimate ‘retreat from the world.” Malcolmson, Heart-Work, 243 n. 4. To this end, she disagrees 
almost wholeheartedly with Strier, who has argued cogently for form to in fact mirror the 
religious content of Herbert’s poems.   
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Malcolmson speaks.  For now, it is enough to say that what Malcolmson has revealed is the 
particularly interesting intersection of ambitious conduct and doctrinal behavior in the context of 
Herbert’s “coterie verse.”  What remains to be seen is why exactly Herbert’s formal project 
would be effective in a context involving both ambition and spiritual amelioration.  
Herbert’s Method of Assurance in The Temple 
 The Temple begins with “The Church-porch,” a lengthy catalog addressing matters of 
Christian decorum.  However, this poem is functionally different than other poems in The 
Temple which deal with similar subject matter.  Strier notes its outlier status, insofar as the 
outright “moral counsel” it contains concerns itself with worldly advancement: “The message of 
the poem is ambition and privilege.”88  While Fish is convinced that “The Church-porch” is 
directed to a young man belonging to the general class “to whom catechisms were customarily 
addressed,”89 I agree with Strier that Fish’s reliance on catechistical logic precludes the poem’s 
rather obvious obsession with self-advancement:90 
Thou, whose sweet youth and early hopes inhance 
Thy rate and price, and mark thee for a treasure; 
Hearken unto a Verser, who may chance 
Ryme thee to good, and make a bait of pleasure. 
 A verse may finde him, who a sermon flies, 
 And turn delight into a sacrifice.  (1-6) 
 
Yet “A verse may finde him, who a sermon flies” can certainly be taken (and was perhaps meant 
to be taken) in the sense Fish asserts.  This hints perhaps that it is not the content of the poem 
that renders Fish’s and Strier’s readings mutually exclusive, but the way in which that content is 
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89 Fish, Living Temple, 126. 
 
90 Strier, “Sanctifying the Aristocracy,” 47 n. 46. 
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mobilized — that is, how its concepts are rendered formally.  Lines like “If reason move not 
Gallants, quit the room / (All in a shipwrack shift their severall way) / Let not a common ruine 
thee intombe” (43-35) do engage with issues of prudence, kairos, and common Christian values 
that the rest of The Temple will explore, and thus makes “The Church-porch” an appropriate 
introductory piece.  But such issues of decorum are not deployed in a way that would involve the 
reader in the complexity of discharging such virtues: 
Despite its opening mention of turning “delight into a sacrifice,” “The Church-porch” 
does not aim to transform its audience.  It is not clear, moreover, that the speaker of the 
poem — whom I believe to be fully identical with the young George Herbert — believes 
that his audience needs to be fundamentally transformed.  There is no indication that the 
values of the speaker are different from those of his audience.91 
 
What is immediately evident in Strier’s reading is that, if we are to consider the poem as 
rhetorical at all, it should be a species of epideictic, more concerned with displaying shared 
normative values than with assuaging existing spiritual anxieties in Herbert’s readership.  Strier 
also notes the fact that this poem might very well predate the poems located in The Temple 
proper,92 so we must take into account an older, perhaps more sympathetic and doctrinally aware 
Herbert’s intention in placing “The Church-porch” at the figurative entryway into his Temple.   
Strier might also suggest an answer to this when he makes the claim that “Herbert’s later 
revulsion from such considerations [of self-advancement] is inversely related to the prominence 
of such considerations in ‘The Church-porch’ and in the life which this poem both reflects and 
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92 “I have already suggested that ‘The Church-porch’ is a very early poem of Herbert’s.  I 
have argued elsewhere that Herbert’s major lyrics exhibit an extreme sensitivity to and revulsion 
from prudential and self-enhancing considerations.” Ibid., 56. 
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manifests.”93  If “The Church-porch” acts as a kind of counterpoint to the logic, both 
thematically and formally, of the rest of The Temple (this poem is both a thematic and formal 
introduction), we can hypothesize what use a more poetically mature Herbert might have for it.  
Indeed, in the beginning stanza, Herbert identifies himself as a “Verser,” which carries the 
connotation of being something less than a fully-fledged poet (a quite overt use of sprezzatura).94  
To get at this use a mature Herbert might have, we will need to consider a poem concerned with 
similar matters, and yet distinct in how it addresses such matters formally.   
“Employment” (II) perhaps addresses the coterie that Malcolmson argues is so essential 
for understanding The Temple: 
He that is weary, let him sit. 
  My soul would stirre 
And trade in courtesies and wit, 
  Quitting the furre 
To cold complexions needing it. (1-5) 
 
Immediately, one can perceive the formal counterpoint: the image of discharging one’s station is 
transformed into a gesture of Christian charity evidenced by the speaker’s taking in a fellow 
Christian from the cold — a heated interior is suggested by the following stanza’s metaphor: 
“Man is no starre, but a quick coal / Of mortall fire” (6-7) — and giving him added warmth 
(“trade in courtesies and wit”).  In the poem, Herbert transforms a practical and very likely 
aesthetic object (“furre,” standing in metaphorically for trading in “courtesies and wit”) into one 
with spiritual benefit: for Herbert, (as Malcolmson has shown) conversation is at the same time 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 56. 
 
94 According to Hutchinson’s note, “Verser” is “a more modest claim than poet for the 
writer of the didactic introduction.” See The Works of George Herbert, Edited by F.E. 
Hutchinson (1941: Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 477.  This use of “Verser” 
might also be a species of sprezzatura, inasmuch as it would serve to render the poetry which 
follows all the more impressive. 
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spiritual, practical, and aesthetic.  To the degree that this aspect of conversation is paralleled by 
poetic debate, aesthetic grandeur is what advances Herbert’s poetry in his circle, and is what 
allows it to do its pastoral work.  Thus “trade in courtesies and wit” (if we take “trade” in its 
nominal, economic sense) is precisely the situation that would advance or secure Herbert socially 
within his coterie.  What we have, then, is a tension resting on that between a reading of the 
narrative action of the poem and a perhaps more symbolic reading that could indicate the less-
than-spiritual work the poem is performing.  If we take Malcolmson’s contextual argument at its 
full force, both are equally suggestive renderings of “trade” — the reader is left to decide which 
to choose, or, more importantly, if both readings are in fact mutually exclusive.  In any case, the 
interpretive capacity and discernment of the reader is called out as being integral to the 
completion of the poem, resting on a tacit privileging of the multivalence of “trade.”  This moves 
towards an empowerment of the reader that rests on the dispensation of a formal artifact, one 
based on questions raised of how best to discern that formal artifact.  One within Herbert’s 
aristocratic circle might mark it as a witty, metathematic remark about the nature of coterie verse 
couched in religious metaphor; in a quite different orientation, the aristocratic reader having 
serious doubts concerning his spiritual status would perhaps sense that a fundamental capacity 
within him was being exercised and strengthened.  This engagement with social and religious 
horizons, both centered on the poem as artifact, represents the intersection of what Frances 
Cruickshank calls the distinct “horizontal” and “vertical” planes” literary scholarship must 
address for a proper a consideration of the aesthetics of the lyric: 
The horizontal plane, the one privileged by new historicism, is about attachments, 
histories, practices and episodes…. The vertical plane is about verbal space and literary 
architecture; prosody, imagery, narrative; authority, sincerity, humility, self-
consciousness; the physical, sensual sound and taste of words; the event of which 
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historical context is the immediate past.95  
 
English Calvinism and Herbert’s coterie (and attendant high-culture aesthetics and courtesy 
implicated in both) here make up the horizontal plane that needs to be taken into account in 
addition to form.  The horizontal plane, then, provides an answer to the question of how a 
hypothetical, anxious aristocratic reader might plausibly react to the dispensation of the formal 
object in question.  In Cruickshank’s terminology, this is a question of how “visible problematics 
are part of a new kind of literary consciousness that invites the reader to participate knowingly in 
poetry’s operations.”96 
 How the rest of the poem is handled is a further indication of the importance of these 
“visible problematics.”  After the wonderfully hair-raising metaphor of man as a mortal coal, the 
desire of whom “Lets his own ashes choke his soul,” comes the most doctrinally dense conceit of 
the poem: 
Oh that I were an Orenge-tree, 
  That busie plant! 
Then should I ever laden be, 
  And never want 
Some fruit for him that dressed me.    (21-25) 
 
This militates, if but momentarily, against life considered as “a businesse, not good cheere” (16) 
— incidentally, the view of life represented in “The Church-porch.”  The image of the tree 
represents the naïve version of Christian courtesy, that by faith (fruit) we can recompense him 
who “dressed” us (fertilized with faith).  The contradiction here is immediately evident.  This 
moves the reader on to the final stanza, and to the final metanoia: 
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But we are still too young or old; 
  The Man is gone, 
Before we do our wares unfold: 
  So we freeze on, 
Until the grave increase our cold.  (26-30) 
 
The melancholy note on which this ends cannot be ignored, but it is only so if the contradiction 
is taken in its negative sense.  Again the reader is asked to choose between two possibilities: (1) 
the fact that we cannot recompense Christ with faith because we already have it, and in this sense 
lack capability, or (2) the blissful fact that we already have faith.  The discerning reader will 
notice that the central image obscures assurance behind a witty, melancholic conceit the fact that 
the poem argues for the reader’s having saving faith.  The process of metanoia or correctio here 
(having the reader choose between competing metaphors) acts to destabilize a monolithic reading 
of melancholy, allowing room for the reader to navigate conscientiously towards the positive 
assertion of Christian assurance.  Herbert acts here to align (or rather misalign) the courtesy 
tradition he is familiar with (cited at the beginning of the poem) with Protestant doctrine in a way 
that, while thematically critiquing the Christian’s capacity to “work” for his own faith, argues for 
assurance by implication — a tacit argument for the importance of the reader’s faculty of 
discernment, and thus engages with the secular kind of work aesthetic discernment entails.  If the 
reader has successfully negotiated the problematic metaphors, then, the irony (insofar as the wish 
to give back obviates the need to work for his salvation by implying that he already has it) 
behind the speaker’s naïve wish to be the tree that gives back becomes clear as a strategic, 
dispositive motion to show how one can come to a successfully doctrinal understanding of the 
poem.  That is, if one discerns how the tree conceit implodes under the weight of its ironical 
logic (one is already what one wants to be), one gets at the doctrinal logic of assurance couched 
within it.  In a roundabout way, at least, form argues for content here.  Herbert, by counting on 
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his reader’s aesthetic discernment to aid in deconstructing the poem’s imagery, re-erects out of 
its ruins an argument for a faculty of discernment that addresses problems of assurance.  
“Jordan” (I) asks, “Is there no truth in beautie? / Is all good structure in a winding stair?” (2-3).  
It seems that “true” beauty is got at precisely by not having a “good structure,” at not least in the 
traditional sense.  Herbert’s good structure is of a completely different kind than that seen in a 
more traditional poem such as “The Church-porch.”  Rather than resting final and complete, 
Herbert’s “good structure” revels in inconsistencies that exist in order give the reader a space to 
safely navigate failure and come out the better for it. 
In “The Church-porch,” however, there is no such room for maneuvering.  At best, “The 
Church-porch” implies that considering Christian doctrine and self-advancement have some 
economy in the poetic sequence that follows.  At worst, it precludes the possibility of readerly 
engagement of the kind that translates “Employment” (II) successfully into a poetic situation — 
one of many different such scenarios that make The Temple a comprehensive interrogation of 
Christian conduct.  What makes this interrogation engaging with respect to the reader is the fact 
that, unlike “The Church-porch,” rules of conduct are elided in favor poetic comprehensum.  The 
metaphors of “Employment” (II) create a complex situation wherein poetic behavior invites 
scrutiny; things such as prudence, kairos, and Puttenham’s “decencie” are then all back on the 
table.  Herbert here deals pragmatically with the fact, as Bourdieu argues, that “only a virtuoso 
with a perfect command of his ‘art of living’ can play on all the resources inherent in the 
ambiguities and uncertainties of behavior.”97  Hence, to “substitute strategy for the rule is to 
reintroduce time,” a view of practice as containing all of the contingent variables of worldly 
                                                 
97 Bourdieu, Outline, 8. 
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existence.  Part of why “The Church-porch” fails to measure up is because of its normativity; 
indeed, “It is therefore practice … which is annihilated when the scheme is identified with the 
model.”98  This careful balance of aesthetic taste and Calvinist doctrine directly confronts the 
Christian aristocratic reader with engaging situations, a poetic strategy which obviates the need 
for rules like those seen at work in “The Church-porch.” 
That Herbert is aware of this careful economy of aesthetic taste and doctrine can also be 
seen in “Employment” (I), which is the closest we get to a metric of conduct in The Temple 
proper.  We again have an elaborate floral conceit:  
If as a flowre doth spread and die,   
Thou wouldst extend me to some good,  
Before I were by frosts extremitie  
Nipt in the bud”     (1-5)  
 
The next two stanzas extend this conceit, while at the same time they highlight the different 
registers at which praise becomes operative: 
 The sweetnesse and the praise were thine; 
 But the extension and the room, 
Which in thy garland I should fill, were mine 
   At thy great doom. 
 
 For as thou dost impart thy grace, 
 The greater shall our glorie be. 
The measure of our joyes is in this place, 
   The stuffe with thee.  (5-12) 
 
We can easily construe this poem as thematizing the economy of taste and doctrine.  By God’s 
decree (crucially, not Herbert’s), the speaker can only “fill” the garland and call his place (we 
must note the less active connation of occupation here) his own (“the extension and the room, / 
… were mine”).  The platitude which begins the next stanza is mobilized in order to highlight 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 8-9. 
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further this distinction in the stanza’s final two lines:  the “stuffe” (OED: “equipment, stores, 
stock,” or “property”) is with God, while the joy is, perhaps curiously, relocated to the speaker’s 
earthly place or occupation.  In other words, Christian joy lies, unsurprisingly, in not obtaining 
“stuffe” — but here this implies the more important doctrinal point that our only real “stuff,” 
grace, is given to us without asking.  “Measure,” as that which is prescribed or limited in extent 
(it can also mean something that is given), though, also implies its capacity as a verb of 
measuring, the only way to accurately form the picture of “this place” that Herbert is attempting 
to construct.  The definition of the verb form of measure, “to go over with one’s eyes” (OED), is 
important here: the place that is separate from the proper “stuffe” that requires discernment to 
render it appropriately delimited.  Thus the final lines of the poem, “Lord place me in thy 
consort; give one strain / To my poore reed” (23-24) would come across as profoundly 
inappropriate or discourteous.  Even asking for “one strain” for his “poore reed” is asking too 
much, due to the fact that the gift has already been given; failure to recognize the always-prior 
beneficence of God is the same as neglecting to say “thank you.”  The similar process seen in 
“Employment” (II) is implied here: the reader is asked to take appropriate measure of the 
“measure” he already most likely has, grace or saving faith, to the degree that he notices that 
these lines are discourteous — that is, to the degree that the poem is logically (or theologically) 
inconsistent.  Again, the importance is not a formalism that is “internally coherent,” but rather 
“externally coherent,”99 relying on the reader to complete the subjective operations manifested in 
the poem.  Regarding poems such as these that call out to the transcendent, Vendler notes how 
                                                 
99 For a full account of “internal” and “external coherence” in aesthetic theory, see Alois 
Riegl, The Group Portraiture of Holland, Translated by Evelyn M. Kain (Los Angeles: Getty 
Research Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1999), 1-57. 
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“Our sense of Herbert’s highest capacities presses us to ask for an equilibrium never quite 
attained in these optative breathings, with their hothouse repetitions.”100  I think it is precisely 
this perceived disequilibrium, this sense of Herbert perhaps not attaining his “highest capacities” 
that would encourage readerly engagement and would, with the right kind of orientation towards 
aesthetic discernment, argue poetically for assurance. 
Conclusion 
 George Herbert, in other words, cannot presume to simplify Christian experience without 
deluding his readership as to its inherently complex structure, which recourse to mere 
didacticism would accomplish.  I have sought to demonstrate that the contrast of “The Church-
porch” to poems which thematize conduct and employment as they relate to Calvinist doctrine, 
manifest the discrepancy in Herbert’s mind between mere rule-following and the Protestant rule 
of faith.  The active interiority imported into English Protestantism by Perkins and his followers 
of experimental predestinarians helped make overt recourse to rules of Christian behavior 
doctrinally untenable.  Herbert thus had to look to sources other than theologically naïve 
accounts of Christian decorum to assuage the anxiety, centered on the incapacity to altar the 
status of one’s salvation, that the absence of a rubric for behavior engendered, while not at the 
same time abrogating the theological necessity of the absence of such a rubric.  While most 
likely not aware of George Puttenham’s Art of English Poesy, courtesy theory in general was still 
largely operative in the aristocratic class to which Herbert belonged, which still traded in matters 
of patronage and social advancement.  This theory of conduct, combined with a cultural context 
increasingly obsessed with aesthetic grandeur, offered Herbert a way of addressing Christian 
conduct in a non-doctrinal way that ultimately had doctrinal force.  This he accomplishes, I have 
                                                 
100 Vendler, Poetry of George Herbert, 251. 
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argued, by happening on a similar explanatory method as that of George Puttenham, a method 
that, instead of codifying rules of behavior, relies on the discerning faculties of the reader to 
intuit correct decorum from a comprehensive set of examples.  The Temple, in my account, 
represents Herbert’s attempt to create a representative set of situations involving Christian 
decorum that are metaphorized in his poetry, from which the reader with an astute sense of taste 
or discernment may also deduce certain arguments for assurance couched within that set.  I argue 
that a rhetoric of courtesy is recapitulated for a religiously didactic use where such didacticism is 
disallowed; thus, a central motivation of courtesy theory, that of dissembling labor, is given 
operative force within the homiletics of The Temple.  The advantage of this approach is that it 
seeks to synthesize two critical trends in Herbert scholarship: the first investigates The Temple as 
document that imports in various forms the aristocratic ideological concerns; the second treats 
The Temple as a pious extension of Herbert’s pastoral career.  A close attention to conduct, I 
believe, is something Herbert understood as being essential to both: assuaging individual 
religious crises at this point in the history of Protestantism was not dissimilar from assuaging 
class anxiety — in short, English Calvinism carried within it a self-advancing element that could 
be exploited poetically for the clerical purposes of assurance. 
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